Whenever the insanely high level of federal government spending comes up — which is every time federal government spending comes up — federal government spenders immediately trot out a fake solution.

Eliminating “fraud, waste, and abuse” in their spending, they tell us, will magically bring their spending into line with their revenues. No more deficits! Decreasing accrued debt! Lower taxes!

It never “works,” of course. It’s not even really meant to “work.” It’s just meant to distract the American public with some convenient scapegoats while the politicians debate whether to spend a little more or a lot more than previously.

I do have to say, though, that I’ve been mildly positively impressed with the latest iteration of that old trick, Donald Trump’s “Department of Government Efficiency.”

Even for those who believe there’s such a thing as “legitimate” government spending and don’t want the baby thrown out with the bathwater (I’m with the late Harry Browne, who noted “we have to remember — it’s Rosemary’s Baby“), it seems like the Trump administration is accomplishing at least some positive public service with government employment buyouts, reining in USAID, etc.

Maybe we WILL actually see a more “efficient” executive branch out of all this, an organization with fewer extraneous employees and with less inclination to pay (an old example) $435 for a $15 hammer.

But without congressional action to cut spending, it will all end up costing us at least as much, and probably more, than it did before.

Congress, not the president, decides how much money gets appropriated (that is, taxed or borrowed) and what kinds of things it gets spent on.

The only powers the president possesses on that subject are the power to suggest budgets, the power to veto budgets including appropriation amounts he disagrees with — Congress can override him on that — and the power to execute (hence the executive branch’s name) Congress’s instructions.

If a particular government unit receives a budget of $1 billion, then DOGE detects and Trump excises $100 million worth of “fraud, waste, and abuse” from its operations — but Congress keeps that unit’s budget at $1 billion, we MIGHT see “better” or “more efficient” use of that $1 billion, but we’re not seeing any actual reduction in the cost of government.

The House Budget Committee claims that its budget resolution for 2025 through 2034 will “reduce deficits by $14 trillion over the next decade.” Last year’s deficit was $1.9 trillion. Stretched out over a decade, the proposed reduction would still leave an average deficit (borrowed and added to the national debt) of $500 billion per year.

Any ten-year plan is suspect (subsequent Congresses can, and always do, abandon it).

A ten-year plan that forecasts $8.7 trillion in cuts to “mandatory” programs like Medicare is likely dead on arrival.

If Congress isn’t serious about substantial cuts to “discretionary” spending, especially on “defense” (the proposal “preserves critical defense spending”), Congress isn’t serious about cutting spending, period.

Enjoy the DOGE and DOGE-adjacent activities if you like them, but don’t expect them to accomplish much where the cost of government is concerned.

Thomas L. Knapp (X: @thomaslknapp | Bluesky: @knappster.bsky.social | Mastodon: @knappster) is director and senior news analyst at the William Lloyd Garrison Center for Libertarian Advocacy Journalism (thegarrisoncenter.org). He lives and works in north central Florida.

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“One of the first meetings I want to have is with President Xi of China, President Putin of Russia,” US president Donald Trump said on February 13. “And I want to say, ‘let’s cut our military budget in half.’ And we can do that. And I think we’ll be able to.”

Trump deserves our thanks and support in taking aim at US military spending in general, and at the insanely large, outrageously expensive, and mostly useless US nuclear arsenal in particular.

Making sure he feels lots of public love on the matter is a matter of major importance, because the only thing more rare than such talk from an American president since World War 2 has been real action on the idea.

Dwight Eisenhower made a strong rhetorical lunge against the “military-industrial complex,” but only on his way out of office in his 1960 farewell address.

Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy, seemed somewhat inclined to agree with Eisenhower on the subject, and likely paid the price for that agreement in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963.

Since that time, American presidents have considered themselves on notice to tread lightly where the US war machine is concerned.

So, does he really mean it?

I suspect he does.

Even a man with Trump’s tendencies toward saying whatever pops into his head knows that this kind of talk is politically, maybe even personally, dangerous. There’s no upside to saying it if he doesn’t mean it.

And if he’s really interested, as he claims, in reducing the federal government’s drunken-sailor spending, some of the reduction will have to come out of the Pentagon’s hide.

“Defense” (a euphemism for military spending, most of which has little or nothing to do with actually defending the US) is the single biggest category of “discretionary” government spending.

What that means is that every dime of “defense” spending has to be appropriated by Congress and those appropriations have to be signed into law by the president (or, if he refuses, Congress has to override his veto).

The other biggest budget categories — “entitlements” like Social Security and Medicare, as well as service on the government’s debt — are “non-discretionary.” That money gets spent unless Congress and the president actively agree to NOT spend it … a difficult deal to reach.

In other words, if you are not serious about cutting “defense” spending, you’re not serious about cutting spending, period.

Fortunately, the US could probably cut “defense” spending by 90% without sacrifice or danger where actual “national defense” is concerned.

Unfortunately, the military-industrial complex has been the single biggest beneficiary of government largesse at your expense for more than 80 years now. The beneficiaries of “defense” spending will not go gently into that good night.

How strong is the “defense” lobby? Strong enough that congressional debate is always about how much to increase, never about whether to decrease, the size of its welfare checks.

If Trump’s serious about this, he’ll need your support to make it happen. Let “your representatives” in Congress know that their political futures depend on this.

Thomas L. Knapp (X: @thomaslknapp | Bluesky: @knappster.bsky.social | Mastodon: @knappster) is director and senior news analyst at the William Lloyd Garrison Center for Libertarian Advocacy Journalism (thegarrisoncenter.org). He lives and works in north central Florida.

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Last May, Donald Trump  bragged on Truth Social that “IF PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THIS HORRIBLE AND RAPIDLY ESCALATING WAR WITHIN 24 HOURS” (all-caps styling his).

Last October, Trump upped the claim at an Iowa campaign rally: “I will end the war in Ukraine before I even step foot in the White House again.”

The war didn’t end prior to January 20. Nor did the war end by January 21.

However, on February 12, Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin finally held what Trump called a “lengthy and highly productive” phone call, after which Trump touted coming negotiations (with a possible assist from China, the Wall Street Journal reports) to end the war.

That’s a bad idea for at least three reasons.

One reason is the Russian regime — like other regimes, and for good reason — considers the US regime “not agreement capable.”  Going all the way back to its treaties with Native American tribes and continuing up to the present day, the US has a terrible record on holding up its end of deals and complying with provisions of treaties it signs on to.

Another  reason is Putin’s attitude toward negotiating with Trump specifically. Pepe Escobar characterizes that attitude as “negotiating with Team Trump is like playing chess with a pigeon: The bird walks all over the chessboard, sh*ts indiscriminately, knocks over pieces, declares victory, then runs away.”

The third reason, however, is the biggest: The war in Ukraine is not and never has been the US regime’s business.

The war might well have been averted if the US hadn’t fomented a coup in Ukraine in 2014, leading to the secessions of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk, followed by eight years of US-Russia proxy war in the latter two areas and the US throwing gasoline on the fake fire of Ukraine as a prospective NATO member state.

The following full-on war might well have ended quickly — with only those seceded areas in Russian hands — if the US and its NATO lackeys hadn’t simultaneously armed/funded the Ukrainian forces, while leaning on Ukraine to refuse further negotiations after the Russian rejection of an early ceasefire draft.

Donald Trump negotiating with Vladimir Putin on behalf of Ukraine can’t plausibly produce an agreement which either side — let alone the Ukrainian side —  considers itself bound by.

The best course for the US, for Ukraine, and arguably for Russia, is for Trump to tell Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelenskyy that US involvement in the war — arms, funding, and supposed mediation assistance — is drawing to a close.

That would free Zelenskyy to drive the best deal he can and Putin to declare victory, settle for what he has, and pull Russia’s teat out of the Ukraine wringer.

Thomas L. Knapp (X: @thomaslknapp | Bluesky: @knappster.bsky.social | Mastodon: @knappster) is director and senior news analyst at the William Lloyd Garrison Center for Libertarian Advocacy Journalism (thegarrisoncenter.org). He lives and works in north central Florida.

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